In Gove we Trust by Hearne, David
In Gove we Trust 
By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies  
The UK Government has recently published its most up-to-date “No-
deal readiness report”.  In light of the fact that I now have billboard 
adverts screaming at me “UNDER 14 DAYS TO BREXIT” alongside 
exhortations to get “Brexit ready”, it seemed apposite to re-examine 
this. Several things immediately jump out at the reader. 
The first is the document’s dramatic change in tone since the end of 
the May-era. One expects the document’s foreword and preface to be 
political. However, it is fascinating to see the extent to which the rest 
of the document bears the new administration’s political imprimatur. 
The scale of the volte-face in the space of just a few months is 
enormous. 
Under Theresa May’s administration, it was clear that a “no deal” 
Brexit (i.e. one where a Withdrawal Agreement was not agreed) was 
viewed as something to be avoided if at all possible and outlined a 
wide variety of strategies to deal with potential negative impacts. In 
contrast, the present documentation is much more positive about the 
possibility. 
Thus, the document’s “executive summary” contains an entire section 
eulogising the opportunities that Brexit ostensibly provides. Whilst this 
does not contain outright falsehoods, it is fair to say that a substantial 
portion is misleading. 
The section on trade notes that the UK will have the ability to set an 
independent trade policy and “take our own decisions on regulatory 
issues”. The challenge here is twofold. Firstly, regulatory differences 
are what comprise the majority of dreaded “non-tariff barriers”: any 
trade agreement that reduces these (including with either the EU or 
the USA) will necessarily entail a degree of regulatory alignment, 
reducing the UK’s autonomy in this regard. 
Secondly, there is the challenge of geography. For agricultural and 
manufacturing purposes (i.e. most things that move) the UK is part of 
the European market (many international manufacturers also include 
North Africa and/or the Middle East within this). As a result, the UK will 
have no choice but to follow things like European vehicle regulations. 
For example, even if the UK decided to adopt Australian vehicle 
emissions regulations, UK manufacturers would still homologate 
vehicles to EU standards because the EU export market is so 
important. Ultimately, we would end up de facto following EU 
standards anyway. Unlike at present, however, we would have no say 
in them. 
The same is true in agriculture: the UK can attempt to diverge, but the 
economic costs of doing so would be large. There will continue to be a 
trade-off between economic well-being and the degree of divergence 
from EU regulations. The difference is that we will essentially be 
giving up a vote on them. The same, rather disingenuous, points 
apply to the sections on people (i.e. immigration), public services and 
international sanctions. The statement that “[o]ur new points-based 
system will enable us to attract the skilled and talented workers we 
need” is jaw-dropping in the extent to which it misleads. 
The UK already has total control over immigration from outside the 
EU, and it already operates a “points-based” system for non-EU 
migrants. At present, any EU national has the right to move to the UK 
for work. As a result, by definition, any new migration system will 
be more restrictive not less. In other words, it is patently false that any 
new “points-based system” will enable the UK to attract skilled and 
talented workers that it has hitherto been unable to. 
Whilst it is likely that this was the hope of many who voted for Brexit, it 
would be more honest for government literature to admit this rather 
than try to imply that somehow this change will make it easier to 
attract skilled workers. 
In terms of the substance of the document, it is clear that the Civil 
Service has put an enormous amount of time and effort into preparing 
for a no-deal Brexit, with £4bn allocated, 1000 new staff and the 
allocation of 15,000 civil servants to working on it. Nevertheless, in 
many areas there is a limit to what they can do (especially in such a 
short time period). 
The fact that the very first bullet point under the “flow at the border – 
goods” subsection states that: “[b]usinesses would still be able to 
import and export goods if the UK leaves without a deal” subtly 
implies that the impact could be very serious indeed. The reality is 
that the flow of goods at a number of UK border points is critically 
dependent on the actions of France. 
In this sense, the UK would essentially be giving away control over 
the degree of friction at the Dover-Calais strait. As stated by the 
document itself, “The UK manufacturer would need to ensure that UK 
export procedures are complied with, and its French customer would 
need to ensure that French import procedures are complied with”. The 
UK Government can take actions to try and ease the first, but control 
of the latter rests with France. 
Interestingly, many of the more challenging points in the report are 
not, actually, in the report itself. Rather, the reader is referred to other 
documentation (such as the guidance to hauliers on transporting 
goods between the UK and EU)[1]. This makes clear that the UK is 
reliant on the goodwill of the EU Commission in terms of the 
continuing validity of things such as the Community License. 
It also makes clear that those seeking to transport agricultural 
produce will need to apply in advance for an export health certificate. 
The trader must then ensure that there is a suitable border inspection 
post at the intended port and that they are notified at least 24 hours in 
advance of any export. These checks in particular can be time-
consuming and could cause delays at Calais. No amount of ‘no deal’ 
planning by the UK government can wish this problem away as it is 
ultimately under the control of France (unlike at present due to the 
UK’s membership of the Single Market). 
Similar issues apply for those traders who will need to pay customs 
duties at the EU border. Whilst many larger businesses will have the 
know-how to do this, it will be a challenge for many smaller traders. 
Indeed, many industries (such as automotive) are likely to find that 
tariff barriers will more than wipe out any profit margins, making 
production in the UK uneconomic. 
Moreover, frictions at Dover would not only affect that port. There 
would be probable ramifications for other parts of the UK as trade was 
rerouted via alternative ports (most notably Folkestone and 
Southampton/Portsmouth). This would potentially put pressure not 
merely on the M20 (as envisaged by Operation Yellowhammer) but 
also on the A14 (running East-West to Folkestone) and the A34 and 
M3 around Southampton. 
It is difficult to model the stress that additional freight traffic (that 
would otherwise travel via Dover) might put on the UK’s strategic road 
network at these points (and various pinch-points en-route). Many of 
the more dire prognostications might not come to pass. Or they might. 
As Michael Gove, who is in charge of ‘no deal’ planning, put it when 
questioned, “Only the Almighty” can predict the future. Let us pray. 
[1] https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transporting-goods-between-the-uk-
and-eu-in-a-no-deal-brexit-guidance-for-hauliers 
 
